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Ontario’s New Human Rights Policy

In mid-June, the Ontario Human Rights Commission released a new policy entitled “The Policy on Preventing Discrimination Based on Mental Health Disabilities and Addictions” (the “Disability Policy”), which builds on the Commission’s prior Policy and Guidelines on Disability and the Duty to Accommodate.

The Disability Policy covers some of the following areas: recognizing mental health disabilities and addictions, establishing discrimination, forms of discrimination, reprisal, the duty to accommodate, undue hardship, and preventing and responding to discrimination (including the development of policies, education and training). Although the Disability Policy covers protection from discrimination in the course of employment, it also applies to protection from discrimination in relation to goods, services, accommodation and housing.

Particularly important for employers to note is the Commission’s statement that when employees request accommodation due to disability, the employer is not generally to “second guess” the health status of an employee. That presumption can be overruled in a situation where there is a legitimate reason to question the employee; however the general rule is for the employer to take the request in good faith without seeking additional medical documentation. In the words of the Commission, “Where more information about a person’s disability is needed, the information requested must be the least intrusive of the person’s privacy while still giving the accommodation provider enough information to make the accommodation”.

Similarly, an organization must not ask for more confidential medical information than necessary because it doubts the person’s disclosure of his/her disability based on its own impressionistic view of what a mental health disability or addiction disability should “look like”.

As also stated in the Disability Policy, “In the rare case where an accommodation provider can show that it legitimately needs more information about the person’s disability to make the accommodation, it could ask for the nature of the person’s illness, condition, or disability, as opposed to a medical diagnosis”.

While the Disability Policy does not set out new law, it is a helpful summary of the current state of the law with respect to discrimination due to disability and the duty to accommodate, and it should be reviewed by employers dealing with mental health disabilities (including addictions) in the workplace. One note of caution, however: this is an evolving area of law, and the Disability Policy, like all policies of the Commission, do not have the force of law; they merely set out the Commission’s interpretation of the law as of the date the Policy is posted.

The Disability Policy can be found at the following link:  http://www.ohrc.on.ca/sites/default/files/Policy%20on%20Preventing%20discrimination%20based%20on%20mental%20health%20disabilities%20and%20addictions_ENGLISH_accessible.pdf.

Ontario’s New Human Rights Policy

Your Partners Are Not Your Employees: Supreme Court of Canada Clarifies the Application of the Control/Dependency Test

In 2009, John McCormick, an equity partner in the law firm Fasken Martineau DuMoulin LLP (the “Firm”) filed a complaint with the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal, alleging the Firm’s requirement that equity partners retire from the partnership and divest their equity at age 65 was age discrimination in employment, contrary to section 13 of the British Columbia Human Rights Code, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 210 (the “Code”).

The Firm applied to have the complaint dismissed on the basis that the matter was not within the jurisdiction of the tribunal, and that there was no prospect that the complaint would succeed. The Firm’s primary position was that because Mr. McCormick was an equity partner in the firm, there was no employment relationship that could be the subject of a complaint under section 13 of the Code. The Tribunal denied the Firm’s application to dismiss however, and concluded that the relationship between Mr. McCormick and the Firm was one of “employment” for the purposes of the Code.

On judicial review, Justice Bruce of the Supreme Court of British Columbia agreed with the Tribunal, indicating that the application of the Code must be based on a conclusion that the complainant and the alleged offender are in an employment relationship in fact and in substance. In Mr. McCormick’s case, many of the attributes of his relationship with the Firm were the same as those found in a traditional employer/employee relationship and therefore the Tribunal’s decision to deny the Firm’s application to dismiss was justified.

The Court of Appeal disagreed however, and held that despite the broad, liberal and purposive interpretation that must be given to the Code, it is a legal impossibility for a partner to be employed by the partnership of which he or she is a member. The fact that the Firm’s management may exercise similar aspects of control over the partners as may be exercised by the management of a corporation over its employees does not change the relationship from one of partners running a business to one of employment by one group of partners over an individual partner. Accordingly, in a unanimous decision the Court of Appeal determined that there was no employment relationship, so the complaint should be dismissed. Mr. McCormick was subsequently granted leave to appeal this decision of the Court of Appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

On May 22, 2014 the Supreme Court of Canada released its highly anticipated decision dismissing Mr. McCormick’s appeal. Unlike the Court of Appeal which held that as a rule, it was impossible for a partner to be employed by the partnership of which he or she was a member, Madam Justice Abella, on behalf of a unanimous court, took a more contextual approach holding that that the primary question was to examine the essential character of the relationship between Mr. McCormick and the Firm and the extent to which it was a dependent relationship. While Justice Abella agreed with the Court of Appeal that on the circumstances of this case, it was impossible for Mr. McCormick, an equity partner in the Firm, to be employed by the partnership, she refused to close the door on finding a partner could be an employee in other situations. The key, according to Justice Abella, was “examining how two synergetic aspects function in an employment relationship: control exercised by an employer over working conditions and remuneration, and corresponding dependency on the part of a worker.” (at para. 23)

In this case, the Supreme Court confirmed that the Code is quasi-constitutional legislation and that the definition of employment for the purposes of the Code must be approached “consistently with the generous, aspirational purposes set out in s. 3 of the Code and understood in light of the protective nature of human rights legislation which ‘is often the final refuge of the disadvantaged and the disenfranchised’ and of ‘the most vulnerable members of society’”. (at para. 19, references omitted) Nevertheless, even considered in this philosophical framework, the Court found that the protections of the Code could not extend to Mr. McCormick.

Importantly, Justice Abella held that control and dependency are more than a function of whether a worker receives immediate direction from or is affected by the decisions of others, but whether the employee has the ability to influence decisions which critically affect his or her working life. In the case of Mr. McCormick, as an equity partner for some 30 years, he was part of a collective of individuals who had control over workplace conditions and remuneration—i.e. he was part of the collective employer and was not necessarily someone who was in a vulnerable position vis-à-vis that group. The Firm’s management structure and administrative polices to which Mr. McCormick was subject were not viewed as limitations on his autonomy making him dependent on the Firm, but rather, were viewed as necessary incidents of its management. Furthermore, though his income was pooled with his colleagues, his remuneration was set in accordance with his contributions to the Firm, in accordance with polices he would have had a right to vote to implement, and he drew income from the Firm’s profits and was liable for its debts and losses. Overall, the Court found that he was not working for the benefit of someone else, but to his own benefit.

Referring specifically to the decision of the Human Rights Tribunal, Justice Abella found that the Tribunal, in considering the control aspect of the relationship had given insufficient consideration to the underlying power dynamics of the relationship between Mr. McCormick and the Firm, and had focused unduly on the administrative polices which governed his activities within the Firm. In this case, where there was no genuine control over Mr. McCormick, an employment relationship could not be established for the purposes of the Code.

Justice Abella was careful not to close the door on other partners being found to be employees for the purposes of the Code in other circumstances. However, she was clear that such a situation would require normal partnership rights, powers and protections to be “greatly diminished”. (at para. 46). The Court was also careful to point out in obiter that while Mr. McCormick might not be able to avail himself of the protections of the Code, partners alleging discrimination nevertheless could have recourse against their partners with respect to the duties of utmost fairness and good faith required by the Partnership Act. However, the Court was careful to avoid commenting on whether such recourse was available in this instance.

Noteworthy, also released today was the United Kingdom Supreme Court decision of Clyde & Co LLP and another v. Bates van Winkelhof, [2014] UKSC 32. In that case, an equity partner in a law firm sought whistleblower protection granted to employees under the Employment Rights Act 1996. In this decision the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that the partner was a “worker” (as defined) for the purposes of that legislation. In that case, the Court was clear that there was no contract of employment between the partner and the firm in question, rather the decision turned on whether under the partnership agreement in question, the partner had undertaken “to do or perform personally any work or services for another party to the contract whose status is not by virtue of the contract that of a client or customer of any profession or business undertaking carried on by that individual.” In this case, whether or not the partner was a worker turned largely on interpretation of the applicable statute in conjunction with the applicable partnership legislation. However, the Court also reviewed the concept of “subordination” (a permutation of the control and dependency test) and held that because the partner could not market her services to anyone other than the firm with which she was employed, and because she was an integral part of her business, she fell within the definition of worker in that case. Notably, the partner in question, although an equity partner, was junior in the sense that she received a fixed income and that there was a level of Senior Equity Partner above her, the antecedents to which appeared to fall more in line with the traditional benefits of partnership. Nevertheless, the Court in Clyde & Co did not necessarily focus on these factors in rendering its decision.

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Your Partners Are Not Your Employees: Supreme Court of Canada Clarifies the Application of the Control/Dependency Test

Discrimination due to Family Status – The Final Word?

In a just-released decision, the Federal Court of Appeal has confirmed that the ground of discrimination due to family status under the Canadian Human Rights Act includes parental obligations which engage a parent’s legal responsibility for a child, such as childcare obligations.  But fear not employers - parental choices such as voluntary family activities will not trigger similar claims of discrimination due to family status.

Background:

On May 2, 2014, the Federal Court of Appeal released its long-awaited decision in the case of Johnstone v. Canada Border Services Agency (“CBSA”).  Fionna Ann Johnstone had been employed by the CBSA since 1998, and her husband was employed by the CBSA as well.  After having children, Johnstone asked for accommodation to her work schedule at Pearson International Airport.  The CBSA had a complicated work schedule for its full-time employees, which included rotating through 6 different start times over the course of days, afternoons and evenings with no predictable pattern, as well as working different work days during the duration of the schedule.  The schedule was based on a 56 day pattern and subject to change on 5 days’ notice.  Johnstone could not find a caregiver due to her schedule and her husband was unable to cover her work days with any certainty as he was subject to the same unpredictable schedule, albeit one that was not coordinated with hers.

Johnstone requested accommodation in the form of a fixed full-time schedule but was only offered a fixed part-time schedule.  Interestingly, the CBSA had previously accommodated disabled employees with a fixed full-time schedule, but it refused to do so in this case because it felt it had no duty to accommodate Johnstone’s childcare responsibilities.

The case moved through a long and circuitous route beginning in 2004 from the Human Rights Commission to the Federal Court, back to the Human Rights Tribunal and finally to the Federal Court of Appeal (with judicial review of some decisions along the way).

The Decision:

After reviewing the law in great detail, the Federal Court of Appeal determined that family status includes childcare obligations which a parent cannot neglect without engaging his or her legal liability.  The court was careful to confirm however, that voluntary family activities such as family trips and extracurriculars do not fall under the family status protections, as they result from parental choices rather than obligations.

In turning to whether or not a prima facie case of discrimination due to family status has been made out, the court stated that an employee must be able to demonstrate the he or she has unsuccessfully sought out reasonable alternative childcare arrangements, and is unable to fulfill his or her parental obligations as a result.  More particularly, the court invoked a four-part test under which the individual making the claim of discrimination must show: (i) that a child is under his or her care of supervision; (ii) that the childcare obligation at issue engages the individual’s legal responsibility for that child, as opposed to a personal choice; (iii) that he or she has made reasonable but unsuccessful efforts to meet those childcare obligations through reasonable alternative solutions; and (iv) that the workplace rule interferes in a manner that is more than trivial or insubstantial with the fulfillment of the childcare obligations.

Based on all of the above, the Court upheld the finding in favour of Johnstone, together with most of the remedies awarded by the lower court (lost wages and benefits from 2004; $15,000 for pain and suffering; $20,000 in special compensation due to the fact that CBSA was found to have engaged in a discriminatory practice wilfully and recklessly).  In addition, the CBSA was ordered to consult with the Canadian Human Rights Commission to develop a plan to prevent future incidents of discrimination due to family status.

There remains just one ground of appeal left for this matter, and it will be interesting to see whether the CBSA moves for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

 

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Discrimination due to Family Status – The Final Word?

“Oh, what a tangled web we weave when first we practice to deceive.”

Employer avoids liability for harassing texts sent by rogue employee

In an interesting decision, the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario has ruled that an employer is not liable for discriminatory and harassing texts sent by a rogue employee to another of its workers.

In Baker v. Twiggs Coffee Roaster, Tamra Baker commenced a human rights application against her former employer, Twiggs Coffee Roaster, alleging that her pregnancy was a factor in the decision to terminate her employment. In support of her application, Baker relied on a series of text messages that she received from her friend and coworker, Cara VanDerMark in which VanDerMark advised Baker that the owner of the coffee shop had found out that Baker was pregnant and didn’t believe that she could do her job as she became “bigger”. Of course, this was all news to the coffee shop’s owner, who had instructed VanDerMark to call Baker and let her know that she was not needed for her scheduled shift; the owner intended to terminate Baker’s employment later that day for performance reasons.

Following a two-day hearing, the Tribunal ruled that there was no evidence to suggest that the employer knew that Baker was pregnant at the time that her employment was terminated. As a result, there was no breach of the Human Rights Code. Based on the evidence, the Tribunal concluded that VanDerMark had mistakenly thought that it would be less upsetting to her friend to think that her employment was terminated because of her pregnancy instead of her job performance, so she lied.

However, because VanDerMark’s text message could arguably constitute sexual harassment, the Tribunal considered whether the employer should be held vicariously liable for her behaviour. Ultimately the Tribunal recognized that under the Human Rights Code, a corporation cannot be held vicariously liable for the acts of its employees, agents or officers when it comes to sexual harassment unless the employer was aware of the behaviour and failed to take reasonable steps to correct it. Given that the employer was unaware of the co-worker’s texts, it could not be vicariously liable for these actions.

This case is a good reminder for everyone – employers and employees – to think before they click send on any text or e-mail message. As this case demonstrates, trouble may be only one click away!

Baker v. Twiggs Coffee Roaster, 2014 HRTO 460

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“Oh, what a tangled web we weave when first we practice to deceive.”

Direct Evidence of Discrimination not Required: Ontario Human Rights Tribunal

Direct evidence of discrimination is not required for an employee to succeed before the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario, the Tribunal has decided.  The decision provides guidance as to what evidence is required to prove discrimination.

In Islam v. Big Inc., 2013 HRTO 2009, the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario ordered a Toronto restaurant to pay nearly $100,000 in damages to three former kitchen employees.

The former employees alleged discrimination in employment contrary to the Ontario Human Rights Code after their employment ended (two of the employees were dismissed while the third quit). The applicants were immigrants from Bangladesh who spoke Bengali and were practising Muslims. They alleged discrimination by their employer on the grounds of race, colour, ancestry, place of origin, ethnic origin and creed. Their complaints included allegations that the owners mocked them when they spoke Bengali, implemented an “English in the kitchen” rule, insisted that two of the employees taste pork even though it was against their religious beliefs, and forced one worker to taste the food he was preparing while he was fasting during Ramadan.

In its decision, the Tribunal discusses what evidence is required to prove discrimination:

Direct evidence of discrimination, such as testimony from a witness to discriminatory conduct, is not necessary to establish a breach of the Code. The applicant may rely on circumstantial evidence, which may include evidence of actions or omissions on the part of the respondent that raise inferences that a Code provision has been breached. The inference drawn need not be inconsistent with any other rational explanation to provide evidence of discrimination. Rather, it must be reasonable and more probable than not, based on all the evidence, and more probable than the explanation offered by the respondent. Evidence must always be sufficiently clear, convincing and cogent to satisfy the “balance of probabilities” test stated by the Supreme Court of Canada in F.H. v. McDougall, 2008 SCC 53 (CanLII).

In this case, the parties disagreed as to whether many of the alleged incidents had occurred at all. The Tribunal held that “finding that it is more probable than not that a contested event occurred or did not occur is not the same as finding that any particular witness is not speaking the truth”. There is a difference between credibility (i.e. a willingness to speak the truth as the witness believes it to be) and reliability (i.e. the actual accuracy of the witness’s testimony). The Tribunal outlined the following factors to be considered in appraising reliability and credibility of witnesses:

  • The internal consistency or inconsistency of evidence;
  • The witness’s ability and/or capacity to apprehend and recollect;
  • The witness’s opportunity and/or inclination to tailor evidence;
  • The witness’s opportunity and/or inclination to embellish evidence;
  • The existence of corroborative and/or confirmatory evidence;
  • The motives of the witnesses and/or their relationship with the parties;
  • The failure to call or produce material evidence.

Despite the fact that the Tribunal found “[t]here is little uncontested or objectively verifiable evidence available to guide [it] in making findings of fact”, the Tribunal ordered the respondent to pay to the three applicants close to $28,000, plus interest, to compensate for loss of income. In addition, the Tribunal awarded damages to the three employees, in the amounts of $37,000, $22,000 and $12,000 respectively, to compensate for violations of the inherent right to be free from discrimination, and for injury to dignity, feelings and self-respect, including the continuing stress caused by failure to investigate his complaints of discrimination.

Islam v. Big Inc., 2013 HRTO 2009

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Direct Evidence of Discrimination not Required: Ontario Human Rights Tribunal

Don’t be “Convicted” of Discriminating based on Criminal Convictions

Picture it: you have the perfect person to hire. You run the background check, and discover a criminal conviction. You are inclined to withdraw the offer, but suddenly you are faced with the question: can I do it?

The answer will depend on which province you are in. Below is a summary of the human rights implications of asking about criminal convictions in Ontario, BC, Quebec, Alberta and Saskatchewan. In addition to the human rights implications, an employer will also have to consider privacy rights in proceeding.

Ontario

In Ontario, there is no protection for applicants for employment against differential treatment based on a conviction, unless the conviction is for (i) a provincial offence or, (ii) in the event of a criminal offence, a pardon has been obtained. This occurs because although the Ontario Human Rights Code does provide protection from differential treatment based on a “record of offences”, it defines “record of offences” as follows:

“a conviction for,

(a) an offence in respect of which a pardon has been granted under the Criminal Records Act (Canada) and has not been revoked, or

(b) an offence in respect of any provincial enactment.”

Given this definition, there is no protection against differential treatment based on a criminal offence (which is a federal statute), unless a pardon has been obtained. Accordingly, an employer can treat a person differently based on an unpardoned criminal conviction in Ontario.

British Columbia

The B.C. Human Rights Code prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of a summary or criminal conviction where the offence is “unrelated to the employment or to the intended employment of that person”. As such, an employer may not treat a person differently on account of a criminal record unless it is related to the employment. In this respect, the B.C. Code protects a broader range of situations than the legislation in Ontario. The B.C. Human Rights Tribunal and courts have consistently held that whether a conviction is related to employment must be considered in every case with respect a series of factors, including:

  1. whether the behaviour for which the charge is laid, if repeated, would pose a threat to the employer’s ability to carry on business safely;
  2. the circumstances and particulars of the offence, including the individual’s age and other extenuating circumstances; and
  3. the amount of time elapsed since the charge and the individual’s activities or rehabilitation efforts since that time.

Given these provisions, employers in BC must be cautious in asking for information concerning a criminal record; depending on the type of job for which the person is being hired, even asking for this information may expose an employer to a human rights or privacy complaint.

In B.C., if an employer asks a job applicant whether he or she has a criminal record, and the applicant answers “yes” to the question, the employer may not disqualify the person simply on that basis without exposing itself to a human rights complaint. From a practical perspective, it may be difficult to defend such a complaint if the person is otherwise qualified for the position. An employer would have to demonstrate that the particular offence is related to the person’s employment by obtaining more information about the offence and the circumstances surrounding it, including considering the above factors. If it can demonstrate that the conviction is related to the person’s employment – for example, an applicant for a controller position has a fraud conviction from six months ago – then it may be able to disqualify the applicant on that basis.

Quebec

The Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms (the “Charter”) prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of a penal or criminal conviction where the offence is “in no way connected with the employment or if the person has obtained a pardon for the offence”.

Accordingly, in Quebec, if an employer refuses to hire an applicant because of his/her criminal record or dismisses an employee for the same reason, it must be able to demonstrate that there is a connection between the criminal record and the employment. The question of the connection to the employment is examined on a case-by-case basis, considering factors similar to those outlined in respect of the B.C. legislation above. In general terms, the greater the degree of integrity and trust that the position requires, the easier the connection may be to establish because the expectations of an employer in such a position will be higher.

 Alberta

Alberta does not have “criminal convictions” or something similar as one of the prohibited grounds in its Human Rights legislation. There is therefore always an argument that a refusal to hire someone due to a criminal record is not discriminatory in Alberta with respect to human rights. That said, employers should be careful when making a hiring decision based on information or a conviction that is not related to the position for which the person is being hired. The employer should also obtain consent to conduct these searches and procedures should be put in place to satisfy any privacy obligations with respect to the disclosure of this personal information (i.e. only limited personnel in Human Resources should view the results and the information should be kept in a secure location, etc.). Alberta’s Personal Information Protection Act may also place restrictions on what personal information an employer may gather in the course of background-checking a job applicant.  B.C. and Quebec also have their own provincial personal information protection legislation that should be considered in those provinces.

Saskatchewan

Similar to Alberta’s legislation, The Saskatchewan Human Rights Code does not list “criminal convictions” or anything similar as one of its prohibited grounds. It appears that the Saskatchewan Human Rights Commission conducted an extensive review of its Code in 1996 and recommended that the list of prohibited grounds be expanded to protect people from discrimination if they have been charged with or found guilty of a criminal or summary conviction offence that is unrelated to their employment or intended employment. However, this recommendation still does not appear to have made its way into the current version of the Saskatchewan Code. As a result, asking this type of question should not be considered discriminatory in Saskatchewan because it is not a protected ground. Nevertheless, similar to Alberta, employers should be cautious in proceeding with such checks and in relying on such information.

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Don’t be “Convicted” of Discriminating based on Criminal Convictions

Compliance Reminder – Accessibilty for Ontarians with Disabilities Act

The Accessibility for Ontarians with Disabilities Act (“AODA”) has been around for a while.  So what’s the big deal now?

For starters, recent Freedom of Information Act requests have demonstrated that about 70% of Ontario private sector employers with 20 or more employees have not yet complied with required self-reporting requirements to demonstrate that they are compliant with the AODA.  Perhaps more importantly, most private sector employers with 20 or more employees don’t even realize that they have certain obligations under the AODA as of January 1, 2014.

While reference should be had to the legislation for particulars as to the imminent requirements, the following should serve as a high level overview of what needs to be done by certain employers.

1.  Public sector employers with 20 or more employees are to file a compliance report with the Ontario government by December 31, 2013, confirming that they are currently compliant with the Accessibility Standards for Customer Service.  The filing can be done online.

2.  By January 1, 2014, those same employers must also develop policies governing how they will meet their requirements under the Integrated Accessibility Standards.   In addition, a multi-year accessiblity plan must  be developed, posted on the organizations’ websites, and provided in an accessible format upon request.

3.  For employers with 50 or more employees in Ontario that are launching a new website or undertaking a significant website refresh after January 1, 2014, the website is required to conform to the World Wide Web Consortium Web Content Accessbility Guidelines 2.0 Level A unless an exception applies or the company can demonstrate that meeting the guidelines is not practical.

Because most Ontario businesses are not compliant with the AODA, the Ontario government has begun issuing notices of non-compliance and has indicated that it intends to pursue businesses which are non-responsive.

For further information, see the Ontario government’s website on AODA requirements: http://www.mcss.gov.on.ca/en/mcss/programs/accessibility/

 

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Compliance Reminder – Accessibilty for Ontarians with Disabilities Act

Human Rights claims in the Ontario courts – Now What?

Way back in 2008, the Ontario Human Rights Code was amended to permit human rights claims to be piggybacked onto wrongful dismissal actions in the Ontario courts.  Prior to that time, the only recourse for an employee with a discrimination claim was to make a complaint to the [then] Human Rights Commission.  Some 5 years later, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice has recently released its very first decision in a joint wrongful dismissal/discrimination action.

The case in question was the September decision of Justice Grace in Wilson v. Solis Mexican Foods Inc.  Patricia Wilson was a 16 month employee at the time of her termination, and off work due to back problems.  The reason given for Ms. Wilson’s termination was a corporate reorganization, but the court found that reasoning “[defied] common sense” as Ms. Wilson was never told about the impending reorganization while it was taking place.  The court looked closely at the communications between Ms. Wilson’s doctor and employer, and found that the only conclusion that could be drawn was that the employer was not happy with Ms. Wilson’s ongoing back problems and absences from work, or her requests for accomodation.  Justice Grace reiterated that as long as an employee’s disability is a factor in the decision to terminate, there will be a finding of discrimination.  That is the case whether the disability is the sole factor or simply one small factor in the decision-making process.  In this case it was clear to the judge that Ms. Wilson’s back problems were a significant factor in the decision to terminate, but the result would have been the same even if her back problems were but one factor along with the reorganization.

Having determined that Ms. Wilson had been discriminated against, the court awarded her $20,000 due to the fact that she “lost the right to be free from discrimination” and experienced “victimization”, and due to the fact that the employer orchestrated her dismissal and was disingenuous both before and during the termination.  That amount was in addition to the damages received in lieu of notice of termination.

Interestingly, the court did not comment on whether or not reinstatement of employment was an option, thereby leaving that issue to another court on another day.  While employees pursuing complaints at the Human Rights Tribunal can seek reinstatement, and while the Human Rights Code appears to permit courts to make similar orders, we still have no guidance as to whether reinstatement will become a tool used by our courts.

To view the decision, click here:  http://canlii.org/en/on/onsc/doc/2013/2013onsc5799/2013onsc5799.html

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Human Rights claims in the Ontario courts – Now What?

Reinstatement of Employment Ordered – a Decade after Disability Leave Commenced

In a March 2013 decision that is likely to be challenged in the courts, the Ontario Human Rights Tribunal has ordered the reinstatement of an employee a decade after she went on disability leave, together with loss of wages from June 2003 until the date of reinstatement.

In a 2012 decision in  Fair v. Hamilton-Wentworth District School Board, adjudicator Joachim found that the respondent school board had discriminated against the employee by failing to accommodate her disability.  In particular, in 2001 she developed an anxiety disorder as a result of the highly stressful nature of her job, and went on long-term disability.  She was subsequently assessed as capable of gainful employment in 2004.  From mid 2003 onwards however, the school board failed to take any steps to offer her available alternative work, even though similar jobs were advertised and the employee underwent job hardening in positions for which the employer was seeking employees.

In March 2013, adjudicator Joachim rendered her decision in relation to the remedy for this case of discrimination.  She found that because: (i) the employee had commenced her initial complaint with the Ontario Human Rights Commission only 4 months after her employment was terminated; (ii) the delay was largely at the hands of the Commission; and (iii) the employee had confirmed that she was seeking reinstatement when her application was subsequently filed with the Tribunal, there was no good reason to not order reinstatement due to the passage of time.

As a result, the employer was ordered to reinstate the employee despite her absence from work for almost a decade.  In addition, the employer was ordered to pay the employee’s lost wages, benefits, expenses and pension contributions over that period of time, which amounted to over $400,000 (subject to any employment insurance and related deductions).  Finally, adjudicator Joachim awarded the Applicant $30,000 as compensation for the injury to her dignity, feelings and self-respect.

Despite the likelihood of an appeal, this is an important decision as it illustrates the potential liability associated with a failure to return an employee to work after his or her disability leave.

Hamilton-Wentworth District School Board, 2013 HRTO 440 (CanLII)

 

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Reinstatement of Employment Ordered – a Decade after Disability Leave Commenced

Former Employee’s Facebook Post about Settlement Breached Confidentiality Provision in Settlement Agreement: Tribunal Reduced Employee’s Monetary Award

Trish-Ann Tremblay had entered into a settlement agreement with her former employer, 1168531 Ontario Inc., on September 13, 2011, with respect to the Human Rights Application she had filed against 1168531 Ontario Inc.. The settlement agreement contained a standard confidentiality provision requiring parties to maintain the confidentiality of the terms of the Minutes of Settlement.

The next day after the mediation, Ms. Amy Lalonde, manager with the Respondent Company, was informed by a colleague that Ms. Tremblay had posted messages on Facebook about the mediation and settlement. In fact, the first message was posted during the mediation session itself:

“Sitting in court now and _______ is feeding them a bunch of bull shit. I don’t care but I’m not leaving here without my money…lol”.

After the Minutes of Settlement were signed, Ms. Tremblay posted the next message as follows:

“Well court is done didn’t get what I wanted but I still walked away with some…”

Shortly thereafter Ms. Tremblay posted the following message:

“Well my mother always said something is better than nothing…thank you so much saphir for coming today…”

While Ms. Tremblay argued that there was no proof that she was talking about the Respondents as she did not mention them by name, the Tribunal held that it was clear from the date of the postings and the comments made that she was referring to the mediation. The Tribunal found that Ms. Tremblay had breached the confidentiality provision of the Minutes of Settlement. However, the Tribunal found that the Respondent Company had also breached the Minutes of Settlement by not paying Ms. Tremblay the settlement amount.

The Tribunal ultimately ordered that the amount owing to Ms. Tremblay under the settlement agreement be reduced by $1,000. In determining the appropriate remedy, the Tribunal took into account that Ms. Tremblay did not disclose the amount of the monetary settlement in her Facebook posts. The Tribunal also considered the relatively public nature of Facebook, especially in the small community in which the applicant and respondent company resided.

When mediating issues of a sensitive nature, employers should consider including confidentiality provisions in settlement agreements that specifically prohibit disclosing terms of settlement on social media sites, including Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, etc.

Tremblay v. 1168531 Ontario Inc., 2012 HRTO 1939 (CanLII)

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Former Employee’s Facebook Post about Settlement Breached Confidentiality Provision in Settlement Agreement: Tribunal Reduced Employee’s Monetary Award